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Eyes Wide Shut: Democratic Reversals, Scientific Closure, and the Study of Politics 
in Eurasia*
 
J. Paul Goode 
University of Bath 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Objectives: The article examines the relationship between democratic reversals and 
scientific closure. It focuses on the effects that authoritarian and hybrid regimes are likely 
to have on the ways scholars study them and conduct their fieldwork. 
 
Method: Thematic content analysis of articles on Eurasian politics published over a ten 
year period, with particular attention paid to reported methods and fieldwork.   
 
Results: Scientific closure had as much to do with research cycles in the discipline as 
with democratic reversals. Notions of the region as democratizing persisted into the 
2000s as scholars recycled data and conceptual frames from the 1990s. Fieldwork-driven 
research was more likely to detect autocratization.  
 
Conclusion: While disciplinary consensus re-framed the region as autocratizing, the field 
remains vulnerable to scientific closure. Aside from the challenges posed by autocracies 
for fieldwork, the new disciplinary consensus may deter qualitative fieldwork and 
innovation in studying authoritarianism in Eurasia.  
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The collapse and breakup of the Soviet state promised not just a democratic 
breakthrough but a social scientific opening. In the 1990s, the former USSR became a 
vast proving ground for theories in comparative politics about regime transitions, 
institutional design, and identity politics. Scholars gained unprecedented access for 
fieldwork in the post-Soviet region at the same time that Eurasia’s newly independent 
states grappled with the challenge (it was hoped) of crafting democracy. In the rush to 
plant comparative politics in post-Soviet soil, research focused on what was readily 
observable, measurable, and otherwise understandable in terms commensurate with 
mainstream political science in the West.  
Aside from the Baltic states, Eurasia lagged considerably behind the pace of 
democratization in the former communist states of Eastern Europe. In fact, democratic 
reversals were more characteristic of the post-Soviet region than democratization. 
Freedom House expert rankings—however flawed—clearly reflect this trend for the 
region over the first decade of the 21st century (See Figure 1).1 Yet the relationship 
between democratic reversals and scholarly access for fieldwork received little to no 
attention in comparison to the linked democratic and scientific openings that followed the 
collapse of the USSR, with the consequence that regime closure threatened to produce 
scientific closure.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
The breakup of the Soviet Union provided a scientific opening in a variety of 
ways, first and foremost by the rapid expansion of access for social science fieldwork in 
the 1990s (Rutland, 2003).  If Sovietologists were ghettoized by the Soviet Union’s 
alleged lack of comparability (except to other Soviet-style systems), “transitology” 
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became a booming academic industry.2  The wave of regime change also significantly 
expanded the number of scholars with interest in the region—including many with no 
prior training in area studies—for whom the former Soviet states provided a vast 
theoretical and methodological proving ground. Moreover, regime change also created 
possibilities for comparative analysis, enabling scholars with regional expertise to publish 
in mainstream disciplinary journals. Data and research on the former Soviet states 
became infused with a wide range of influences and reached a larger audience than ever 
during the Soviet era. Underpinning this development was the assumption that the Soviet 
states had become democratic or were democratizing. 
Based on this experience with scientific opening following the collapse of the 
USSR, it stands to reason that scientific closure may occur in three ways related to 
democratic reversals in the region: first, hybrid and authoritarian regimes can limit access 
to the region and the ability to apply common fieldwork techniques, particularly (though 
not exclusively) for Western scholars. Second, as opportunities diminish for the 
application of methods that presume or require relatively open political environments, 
scholars are more likely to adjust their case selection and relocate their research to more 
congenial sites rather than engage in theoretical retooling or new area training. This is not 
to say that research output necessarily declines but that qualitative, fieldwork-based 
research and direct experience within the region may decline even as interest in the 
region remains high. In other words, the expectation of obstacles to research posed by 
authoritarianism becomes a deterrent. Third, the consensus in the discipline about a 
regime’s dynamics may become resistant to verification through fieldwork, especially as 
involvement of non-area specialists increases. As a consequence, vital information about 
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dynamics within hybrid and authoritarian regimes—including their sources of stability 
and change—potentially goes unobserved and only becomes relevant to the broader 
scientific community after political openings, as with the “color revolutions” in Georgia 
and Ukraine in 2003-4, Kyrgyzstan’s uprising in 2010, and again in Ukraine after the 
ouster of Viktor Yanukovych in 2014.3  
This article unpacks the sources of scientific closure in the study of politics in 
Eurasia. It begins with an assessment of the attributes of hybrid and authoritarian regimes 
likely to affect the conduct of fieldwork. The article next examines whether research 
articles published in political science and area studies journals over the first decade of the 
21st century provide evidence of such effects on scholarly output. The article concludes 
that scientific closure is likely to be related to democratic reversals, but that research 
cycles also play an important role in the ways they resonate with changes in access to the 
field. In the study of Eurasian politics, one might even say that the field of study 
prematurely suffered from scientific closure. Though the study of authoritarianism once 
more occupies a central place in comparative politics, it largely reflects the discipline’s 
preference for formalistic and quantitative analysis rather than a renewed interest in 
fieldwork.  
In examining the relationship between autocratization and scientific closure, it is 
useful to narrow the scope of comparison to post-Soviet Eurasia. First, all countries in the 
region benefited from the scientific and political openings that followed the collapse of 
the USSR at the same time, even if regime trajectories varied. This means that various 
international influences and even regime starting points as potential factors affecting 
access for fieldwork may be held relatively “constant,” whereas comparing fieldwork 
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access in other autocratizing regions or historical periods would complicate matters by 
involving additional contingencies or constraints not present in the post-Soviet cases.4 
Second, for the purpose of comparing variations in published research, scholars focusing 
on the region tend to publish both in general political science journals as well as a 
common pool of area studies journals—indeed, they publish in the latter journals in much 
greater numbers. Involving scholarship on other regions would raise tricky measurement 
issues as not all area scholars publish in the same sorts of venues. Third, the democratic 
reversals in the post-Soviet space are historically and scientifically significant in their 
own right. They are inscribed within a distinct wave of social mobilization and regime 
change that configured the region’s successor regimes and their claims to legitimacy, as 
well as the second wave of electoral revolutions in post-Communist Europe and the 
former Soviet Union (Beissinger, 2007; Bunce & Wolchik, 2010).  
 
AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE POTENTIAL FOR SCIENTIFIC CLOSURE 
As of 2010, only the Baltic states were unambiguously recognized as democratic among 
the former Soviet states. Of the remaining states in Eurasia, four were competitive 
authoritarian regimes, six were hegemonic authoritarian, and two were fully closed 
authoritarian regimes (see Table 1). This distribution of regimes reflects more broadly the 
growth and diversity of authoritarianism in the post-Cold War era, as governments 
assumed to be transitioning towards democracy turned out to be pointed in different 
directions (Carothers, 2002; Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2010). This was 
particularly evident in the post-Soviet sphere, where Russia and the other Soviet 
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successor states saw democracy derailed, trapped in cycles of neo-patrimonial rule, or 
simply “lost in transition” (Fish, 2005; Hale, 2010; Shevtsova, 2007).  
Though regimes that mix formal democratic institutions with authoritarian 
practice existed prior to the end of the Cold War, scholars initially treated them either as 
waypoints in transition (like democradura or dictablanda) or as diminished subtypes of 
democracy (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Collier & Levitsky, 1997; O’Donnell, 1994; 
Zakaria, 2004). “Hybrid” regimes combine elements of democracy and authoritarianism, 
though the term generally refers to forms of authoritarianism featuring semi-competitive 
elections or formally democratic institutions (such as multiparty legislatures) that serve to 
disguise dictatorship (Brooker, 2000).  In this sense, hybrid regimes are sometimes called 
electoral authoritarian regimes (Linz, 2000; Schedler, ed., 2006). The nature of the 
opposition’s participation and the regime’s control of electoral outcomes serve to 
distinguish electoral authoritarian from closed authoritarian regimes and to differentiate 
two varieties of hybrid regimes. In competitive authoritarian regimes, power is obtained 
through formal democratic institutions though incumbents regularly violate the rules to 
maintain office. Nevertheless, incumbents are constrained in their ability to control the 
whole of the playing field. Courts may exercise some independence, some actors in big 
business may not cooperate with the regime, and some independent press exists to 
challenge the regime’s narratives. Opposition parties or candidates compete in elections, 
which incumbents ignore at their peril (Levitsky & Way, 2002). By contrast, hegemonic 
authoritarian regimes allow elections but limit real competition to just the ruling party or 
the regime’s favored candidates. The opposition might be allowed formally to participate 
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in elections but in practice, it is shut of out the ballot box, the media, the courts, and 
sometimes the country (Howard and Roessler, 2006).  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
The nature of hybrid regimes poses particular challenges to the conduct of 
fieldwork when contrasted with democratic and fully closed authoritarian regimes. As a 
general rule, hybrid regimes are sensitive to scrutiny by international actors as regularly 
evidenced by complaints about Freedom House scores or resistance to international 
election monitoring. Since democratic regimes are already open to scrutiny by their 
citizens, they are less sensitive to foreign researchers conducting fieldwork. In electoral 
authoritarian regimes, international scrutiny of a regime’s misdeeds and exposure of 
scandal or vote tampering may provide the opposition with a critical resource, 
emboldening street protests or encouraging defections among the regime’s elite (Tucker, 
2007). 
Where electoral revolutions succeed in post-communist countries, international 
actors actively support the development of civil society and media, encourage unity 
among opposition forces, and provide training and support (Bunce and Wolchik, 2010).  
It is not surprising, then, that various regimes in the post-Soviet region act to limit and 
constrain foreign election monitors, as well as domestic non-governmental organizations 
involved in monitoring fraud and electoral malpractice. To cite a few examples, Russia 
tightened restrictions on election monitors in advance of the 2007 parliamentary elections 
and the 2008 presidential election such that the OSCE pulled out completely (“OSCE 
Election Monitor Cancels Plans to Monitor Vote,” 2008). After adopting new legislation 
in 2012 to force NGOs receiving foreign funding for political activities to re-register as 
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“foreign agents” (a Stalinist-era euphemism for “spy”), the first target of Russia’s Justice 
Ministry was the independent election monitoring agency Golos (Tumanov et al., 2013). 
Belarus initially refused entry visas to a delegation of European Union MPs for 
the 2006 presidential election (BBC, 2006).  Following the 2010 presidential election, it 
ejected the OSCE’s monitors after they accused Lukashenko’s regime of widespread 
fraud (Schwirtz, 2011).  In the run up to Moldova’s repeat elections in 2009, international 
election observers were detained and some were expelled (“Moldovan Officials Detain, 
Expel Election Observers,” 2009). Given this sensitivity, authoritarian regimes in the 
former Soviet region may feel unwilling to draw distinctions between foreign election 
monitors, opposition activists, and scholars who study politics. The experience of 
Standford political scientist Michael McFaul is perhaps instructive in this regard. Almost 
immediately upon his arrival in Moscow as US ambassador to Russia in 2012, McFaul 
was painted by state media as working for American NGOs with the backing of US 
intelligence, insinuating that he was plotting revolution in Russia (Remnick, 2014). 
Sensitivity to scrutiny may also stem from a regime’s awareness of the limits of 
its organizational or coercive capacity, or the degree of its vulnerability to international 
leverage (Way & Levitsky, 2007). In turn, this sensitivity may translate into obstacles for 
conducting fieldwork. One may identify a set of gatekeeper effects that govern a 
scholar’s access to the field. At a very fundamental level, these effects relate to the ability 
to acquire the necessary visas and official permissions. Electoral authoritarian regimes 
may resist the conduct of fieldwork by foreign researchers, or more generally of research 
funded from foreign sources that connects international actors and domestic opposition. 
Foreign researchers are also vulnerable to revocation of visa status while conducting 
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fieldwork or denial of permission in the future. There have been multiple reports in recent 
years of Western scholars accused of visa infractions and deported from Russia, 
particularly those researching political topics (Schreck, 2015). For doctoral students or 
junior scholars, the consequences of such interventions can be dire: deportation can force 
one to abandon future research in the region, or even to change one’s career. 
One may further observe gatekeeper effects in terms of access to elites for 
interviews, opportunities to conduct mass surveys, and scholarly collaboration with 
domestic academics. In each case, a regime’s perceived opportunity to derive value from 
the research may offset barriers to access. Even though elite interviews may be difficult 
to obtain, it is possible that interviewees have an interest in obtaining the very 
information sought by researchers. The opacity of hybrid regimes poses a challenge not 
just to those who study them but also to those working within them. Information about 
the regime’s operation, its viability, or even the likelihood that an individual may possess 
such information may prove an advantage for ambitious elites. By the same token, elites 
might have an interest in spreading disinformation to bolster the regime’s democratic 
claims. In either case, one expects that the decision to grant an interview is taken only 
after the researcher has been vetted (formally or informally). 
In a related sense, it is possible to conduct survey research in competitive 
authoritarian regimes though to differing degrees. Surveys may simply contribute to the 
noise created by other regime-sponsored studies. Alternatively, they can provide the kind 
of information that the regime might otherwise not be able to acquire since elections are 
not a reliable guide to popular sentiment. Since survey research usually relies upon 
collaboration with local research teams, the visibility of foreign researchers is reduced 
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and regimes might consider such variants safer and easier to monitor (or discredit) than 
individual researchers conducting fieldwork. Regardless, there remains some question 
over the utility of survey data gathered in authoritarian regimes. In Russia, a recent 
Levada Center study found that one out of four Russians is afraid of expressing their 
opinion when polled, and more than half believe that Russians do not answer polls 
truthfully for fear of negative consequences (Korchenkova and Goriashko, 2016).  
Scholarly collaboration requires substantial and free-flowing contacts with 
domestic researchers, rendering it vulnerable to monitoring by the regime in question (or 
of attracting its attention). While the autonomy of universities is precarious in non-
democratic regimes,5 hybrid regimes still require policy and administrative expertise such 
that academic institutions are unlikely to be permanently shuttered. In advance of 
Russia’s presidential election in 2008, European University at St. Petersburg was closed 
owing to alleged violations of the city’s fire safety code, though the move was 
understood to be politically motivated. After the election, it was allowed to open its doors 
once more (Petlianova, 2008). In part, whether this kind of interference translates into 
diminished collaboration with foreign academics depends on the resilience and 
determination of domestic scholars in electoral authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, there 
is evidence that political scientists in regional universities retreat from commenting on 
domestic politics for fear of losing their jobs and sometimes they are co-opted by the 
system (Deriabin, 2008). In Uzbekistan, political science was banned altogether from 
universities on official grounds of being a Western pseudo-science that fails to take the 
“Uzbek model” of development into account (Luhn, 2015).  
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It bears noting that these gatekeeper effects point to the difficulty (if not the 
impossibility) of maintaining scholarly distance from one’s subject of study. However 
much scholars may attempt to remain objective and avoid normative engagement while 
conducting fieldwork, it is unlikely that they will be viewed as neutral observers by those 
who live and work in hybrid regimes. Even using the term “regime” is taken by many as 
an insult or an accusation of the government’s illegitimacy. This places an additional bind 
upon researchers in the inability to keep description and prescription separate: avoiding 
prescription may mean that citizens come to perceive the researcher as no better than a 
(Western) regime functionary while they continue to be excluded by regime insiders.  
In addition to gatekeeper effects on interactive methods of data collection, one 
may also find constraints on research methods that rely upon observations of formal 
institutional procedure. Here one is likely to find differences between competitive 
authoritarian and closed authoritarian regimes. In hybrid regimes, the contestation of 
formal institutions remains essential for obtaining power while their ongoing operation is 
necessary for its preservation. While formal institutional proceedings may not prove a 
reliable guide to a regime’s decision-making, they may yet provide opportunities for the 
opposition to register protest or principled disagreement. The more autocratic the regime, 
however, the less it is concerned about controlling opposition than preventing elite 
defections.6 In practice, this means ensuring that agreement among ruling elites and token 
opposition are kept “off the books” to sustain the illusion of contestation and the rule of 
law.  
Related to this is the comparatively greater extent to which hegemonic 
authoritarian regimes constrain civil liberties, particularly freedom of expression. In 
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competitive authoritarian regimes, press sources are weakened by journalistic habits of 
self-censorship and self-preservation, or otherwise by the opportunity to produce news 
favorable to government or opposition at a price. Yet the existence of a legitimate 
opposition with a (slim) shot at power means that opposition or independent press may 
still exist and be triangulated with the pro-government press. In hegemonic authoritarian 
regimes, the expansion of government control over the press limits the possibility of 
identifying even mercenary sentiments. Unsanctioned organization, demonstration, or 
protest will likely go unreported, misreported, or suffer belittlement. Where hegemonic 
authoritarian regimes are more sensitive to international scrutiny, however, they are 
likely to allow a tiny number of opposition press outlets to remain in operation to 
evidence the regime’s formal respect for democratic freedoms.  
 
OBSERVING SCIENTIFIC CLOSURE: PUBLISHED RESEARCH ON POLITICS IN 
EURASIA, 1999-2008 
The model of scientific closure proposed above describes a relationship between regime-
imposed constraints and the pre-research choices made by scholars regarding cases, 
methods, and fieldwork. In a previous study, my examination of published research on 
Russian politics over the period 1999-2008 discovered an overall decline in fieldwork 
that roughly corresponded to rising authoritarianism in Russia (Goode, 2010). While 
scholars did not stop going to Russia altogether, they increasingly utilized data and 
methods that did not require fieldwork. Those who continued to conduct fieldwork 
tended to be established scholars with prior research experience gained during the 1990s 
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or early 2000s. By contrast, emerging scholars appeared to be deterred from conducting 
fieldwork in Russia, choosing to take their preferred methods to more congenial climes. 
The present study widens the scope of published research to include two countries 
each in the European (Belarus and Ukraine), Caucasian (Armenia and Georgia), and 
Central Asian (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) regions of the former Soviet Union. 
Countries that underwent “color revolutions” in the 2000s (Georgia, Ukraine, and 
Kyrgyzstan) are paired with countries within the same region that remained relatively 
unchanged (Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) to observe whether political openings 
were followed by changes in reported fieldwork. The sampled articles also include cross-
national studies. In sum, the expanded study comprises 521 articles featuring clearly 
identifiable methodologies published in thirteen journals over a ten-year period covering 
politics in seven countries.7 The sample excludes purely descriptive, interpretive, or 
synthetic articles.  
I examined each article for evidence of original data collection, nature of research 
design (quantitative, qualitative, or mixed), and fieldwork.8 Despite including scholarship 
on six additional countries and cross-national studies, there were more than twice as 
many articles about Russian politics than the remaining cases combined (see Table 2). In 
relying on scholars’ self-reporting of methods and fieldwork, one may only infer in some 
cases the nature and influence of gatekeeper effects from what is reported in published 
research. Nevertheless, the data suggest a relationship between regime constraints, 
scholars’ research choices, and the likelihood of scientific closure.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
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For the decade as a whole, the average proportion of articles reporting fieldwork 
is reassuringly high (See Figure 2), ranging from 75% to 89% for all countries except 
Russia (44%) and Ukraine (51%). It is worth noting that the number of authors per year 
among these cases is almost equal to the number of articles. In other words, emerging 
scholars continued to enter the field rather than a few established scholars dominating 
publishing space. However, these scholars remained few in number and the high rate of 
turnover suggests that they did not continue researching and publishing about those 
cases.9 In other words, gaining access to the field was not be as uniformly daunting a 
problem in practice as expected, but emerging scholars still appeared to take their 
research elsewhere. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
The high rates of reported fieldwork versus the low rates of publishing (aside 
from Russia, Ukraine, and cross-national studies) suggest that research cycles played a 
significant role in scientific closure. For lesser-known countries, one naturally expects 
fieldwork to be limited by the availability of exotic language skills or prior area training 
aside from regime-imposed constraints. Lesser-known cases thus present scholars with 
higher startup costs given the low density of research infrastructure and the need for 
specialized training. In turn, they conceivably bear a higher evidentiary burden in 
locating cases within established research traditions than better-known cases around 
which a disciplinary consensus has formed.  
Better-known cases benefit from a larger pool of existing data, secondary 
literature, established research infrastructure, and the availability of standardized training. 
Not surprisingly, fieldwork was less frequently reported among articles on Russia, 
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Ukraine10, and cross-national studies relying upon (relatively) common language skills 
and quantitative methods training. In contrast to lesser-known cases, scholars working on 
these areas face a higher evidentiary burden when challenging a disciplinary consensus. 
One might therefore reason that scientific closure is more likely to occur where 
disciplinary consensus (a) is congenial to the regimes studied, and (b) substitutes for—or 
remains in place, despite the deprecation of—fieldwork and research infrastructure.  
There is some evidence for thinking that these conditions for scientific closure 
obtained in the 2000s in the study of Eurasian politics. Research articles involving 
countries of the former Soviet Union favored qualitative over quantitative and mixed 
methods in the latter years of the period under scrutiny (see Figure 3). Qualitative 
methods were responsible for the bulk of reported fieldwork conducted in the former 
Soviet republics with quantitative fieldwork contributing just 6-10% of the total in any 
given year. Particularly curious is that the use of quantitative and mixed methods peaked 
prior to regime change in those countries where color revolutions occurred, followed by a 
rise in qualitative methods in the following years (see Figure 4). In part, this corresponds 
to the expectation that quantitative and qualitative fieldwork face different degrees of 
resistance by electoral authoritarian regimes.  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Given the sensitivity of closed and autocratizing regimes to claims that they are 
not democratic, the cross-national studies are of particular use for probing the 
relationship between regime type and disciplinary consensus. The cross-national studies 
are the only category for which more articles were published in the general political 
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science journals (60%) than area studies journals, meaning they bear a higher visibility in 
the discipline.11 These articles also exhibit the least amount of reported fieldwork (26%) 
and the highest use of quantitative and mixed methods (73%). Thematic content analysis 
of these articles reveals that the most numerous topics are regime transitions and 
democratization (31.6%) followed by parties and elections (23.3%), while 
authoritarianism and hybrid regimes (13.3%) comes next to last (Figure 5). However, if 
one counts just the cross-national articles that reported some form of fieldwork, studies of 
authoritarianism and hybrid regimes take a narrow lead (10%) over regime transitions 
and democratization (8.3%), followed by political economy (5%), and articles on parties 
and elections (1.6%) tie for last with articles on identity and security (Figure 6). In sum, 
cross-national studies not reporting fieldwork were more likely to focus on 
democratization and formal democratic institutions than autocratization and 
authoritarianism.12 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] 
One potential implication is that the lack of fieldwork helped to keep democracy 
and democratization on the academic agenda even when the regimes studied were 
autocratizing.13 Part of the reason for this might be that cross-national studies tended to 
elide differences among regime types.14 More pronounced is the tendency of cross-
national studies to draw upon data collected during the previous decade when regimes 
appeared (or were assumed) to be democratizing.15 It is worth noting that such studies 
favored the use of survey data collected in the European portion of the former Soviet 
Union (Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine) and rarely included cases from Central 
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Asia or the Caucasus. By contrast, studies including data from Central Asia and the 
Caucasus are more cautious in their use of “democracy” and “democratizing” to 
categorize and organize cases.16  
It does not appear to be the case that common knowledge or assumptions about 
the autocratizing nature of post-Soviet regimes produced a non-experiential consensus 
regarding their dynamics. Rather, the lingering assumption of their democratizing nature 
seemed to persist through the 2000s—particularly among cross-national studies lacking 
reported fieldwork. In this sense, the study of post-Soviet regimes might be said to have 
suffered from “premature” scientific closure. In terms of the politics of fieldwork, this 
may further explain why electoral authoritarian regimes in Eurasia exercised gatekeeper 
interference with restraint: there were not that many scholars conducting fieldwork in the 
region, while much of the time the regimes were framed within the universe of 
democratic or democratizing states.  
Against this model of scientific closure, it might be objected that changes in 
methods and fieldwork simply reflect changes in intellectual priorities or the nature of 
research questions driving academic agendas. With particular regard to the color 
revolutions, for example, scholars may have been attracted by “non-routine” or 
contentious politics. Cross-national studies might therefore be a poor indicator of what 
the discipline considers to be on the cutting edge. Instead, one would expect small-n 
comparisons and process-oriented investigation to predominate before new regimes can 
be re-integrated into large-n quantitative analysis. However, there is little evidence of an 
influx of scholars stimulated by regime change and political openings in the region 
during this period. Instead, the color revolutions were covered mainly by established 
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scholars in descriptive and synthetic articles.17 This is especially visible in Ukraine’s 
case—the best covered of the color revolutions—where a sudden increase in publications 
and simultaneous decline in reported fieldwork in 2005 stands in contrast to the previous 
electoral cycle which featured a roughly equivalent level of publications in 2002 with 
nearly all reporting fieldwork (see Figure 7).18 When factoring in the lag time between 
the conduct of fieldwork and publication, the recovery in rates of fieldwork toward the 
end of the decade arguably reflects the extent to which even modest political openings 
facilitated access to the field: all fieldwork for articles published in 2008 was conducted 
between 2005 and 2007, while only two of the articles published during this uptick were 
actually about color revolutions (both on Ukraine).  
[INSERT FIGURE 5.7 HERE] 
AUTOCRATIZATION AND SCIENTIFIC CLOSURE IN EURASIA: A REVISED 
MODEL 
In light of this assessment of published research on politics in post-Soviet Eurasia, the 
hypothesized relationship between regime closure and scientific closure requires some 
revision. I expected to find a clear relationship between democratization, autocratization, 
and access to the field. While there clearly was an increase in reported fieldwork 
following the color revolutions in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine, published research 
on post-Soviet politics generally showed high rates of fieldwork across the board. Much 
of this work was published in area studies journals rather than general disciplinary 
journals, while cross-national studies exhibiting the lowest rates of fieldwork were 
published most often in general disciplinary journals. The latter articles were further 
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characterized by a reliance on quantitative and mixed methods research designs and a 
pronounced tendency to classify Soviet successor states as democratic or democratizing. 
 These observations allow for a re-formulation of the model of scientific closure 
which originates not with democratic reversals, but with the regime openings in post-
Soviet Eurasia that preceded them (see Table 3). While democratization in the 1990s was 
incomplete, at best, it permitted an influx of scholars into the region and facilitated a 
variety of original data collection projects. The regime openings meant that these projects 
were replicable by other scholars (including non-area specialists). Moreover, they quickly 
gained visibility within the discipline. Democratization dominated discussions of post-
communist and post-Soviet politics throughout the decade, forming an academic 
consensus on the region even as the dynamics of transition and democratization were 
hotly debated.19  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Given this consensus, the discipline was slow to acknowledge democratic 
reversals already underway in the 1990s, as scholars preferred instead to characterize 
them in terms of “stalled” transitions in weak states. In turn, framing regime trajectories 
in this fashion allowed for the ongoing use or re-purposing of data gathered during the 
previous period of regime opening, effectively confirming the consensus characterization 
of the region as democratizing even as it moved in the opposite direction. Scholars who 
continued to conduct fieldwork challenged this consensus in documenting autocratization 
in the region, but their research was published in area journals and did not achieve 
visibility within the discipline. As a result, it took real world events to force 
acknowledgement in the field of the eclipse of democratization by autocratization: the 
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color revolutions not only exposed the sham democracies that they replaced, but threw 
into sharp relief their successor regimes as well as other post-Soviet hybrid regimes that 
bore similar attributes but avoided regime change.20 In this sense, the color revolutions 
elevated the visibility of prior studies of autocratization while infirming the scholarly 
consensus around democratization as an appropriate concept for describing the region’s 
political dynamics.  
 
CONCLUSION: NEW CONSENSUS, NEW SOURCES OF CLOSURE? 
The study of post-Soviet politics illustrates that political openings have the potential to 
stimulate social scientific openings—not merely by facilitating access to the field, but by 
disrupting existing consensus about regime dynamics. In the study of Eurasian politics, 
the use of democratizing frames of analysis since the 1990s declined by the end of the 
2000s, along with the rising prominence of the “new authoritarianism” in comparative 
politics. Transformative events like the collapse of Soviet rule and the post-Soviet color 
revolutions thus alter the way entire regions are understood for both scholars and those 
involved in making post-Soviet politics. Indeed, the color revolutions also led observant 
Eurasian autocrats like Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin to take measures to 
avoid a repeat in their own capitals (Koesel & Bunce, 2013; Silitski, 2010). More 
recently these measures included limiting scholars’ access to foreign sources of funding 
and placing collaboration with foreign academics under closer scrutiny. 
The emergence of the “new authoritarianism” and autocratization as a new 
disciplinary consensus occasioned a shift in methods and data that are distinct from those 
previously used for studying democratization. While a full accounting goes beyond the 
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confines of this article, they include the compiling of elite biographies (Buckley et al., 
2014) and social network analysis (George et al., 2016) for studying patronage and elite 
mobility, the use of list experiments in survey design to ask sensitive questions (Frye et 
al., 2016), the creation of new datasets on protest and mobilization (Lankina, 2015), the 
adaptation of electoral forensics for examining stolen elections (Myagkov et al., 2009), 
and the use of content and discourse analysis for assessing the nature of regime 
legitimation (Smyth & Oates, 2015) or protest mobilization (Onuch, 2015).  
To the extent that the new consensus facilitates methodological creativity in the 
study of post-Soviet Eurasia, it follows the discipline’s preference for formalistic 
approaches that draw upon open sources and replicable datasets. As suggested by the 
brief list, above, the main forms of methodological innovation are in quantitative and (to 
a lesser extent) mixed methods. Hence, while research on authoritarianism and 
autocratization in Eurasia now appears more likely to be published in mainstream 
journals and to be valued by the discipline as a whole, it is not necessarily more likely to 
involve fieldwork.  
 In addition, changes in the way political science as a discipline seeks to impose 
quantitative standards for replicability on qualitative data keeps open the possibility of 
scientific closure in the study of Eurasia. The “Data Access and Research Transparency” 
(DA-RT) movement in the American Political Science Association creates significant 
career uncertainty for scholars engaging in qualitative fieldwork in authoritarian or 
autocratizing regimes.21 Much depends on how such a requirement will be implemented. 
In particular, the requirement that scholars hand over their field notes, interview 
transcripts, and other materials to serve as replication data is far more problematic than 
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the presentation of replication data in quantitative studies. In particular, there is a very 
real risk that making such raw data and field observations available would compromise 
the anonymity of respondents, making research involving sensitive topics or vulnerable 
populations impossible to conduct ethically. However, this would be an extreme outcome 
that does not reflect the interests of the discipline or its leading journals.22 Indeed, it 
would be a sad irony if political science embraced the study of authoritarianism in 
Eurasia, only to prove more effective than Eurasian autocrats in deterring scholars from 
conducting fieldwork.  
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Figure 1: Freedom House Democracy Scores, 2000-2010 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Electoral and Closed Authoritarian Regimes in Eurasia (2010) 
Competitive Authoritarian Hegemonic Authoritarian Closed Authoritarian 
Armenia 
Georgia 
Moldova 
Ukraine 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Russia 
Tajikistan 
 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
 
 
  
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
Russia
Belarus
Ukraine
Armenia
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
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Table 2: Summary of Published Research with Identifiable Methods and Fieldwork, 
1999-2008 
Country of 
Study 
Articles Reported 
Fieldwork 
Area 
Journals 
Discipline 
Journals 
Russia 345 152 294 51 
Ukraine 65 33 54 6 
Cross-
national 
60 17 24 36 
Kazakhstan 15 12 14 1 
Belarus 13 9 13 0 
Georgia 9 8 2 7 
Kyrgyzstan 9 8 7 2 
Armenia 5 3 5 0 
TOTAL 521* 242 413 103 
* A few small-n studies were counted for each country of study, hence the slightly higher 
total. 
 
 
Figure 2: Articles Reporting Fieldwork, 1999-2008 
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Figure 3: Research Design (All Countries) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Research Design (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine) 
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Figure 5: Content Analysis of Cross-National Articles 
 
 
Figure 6: Content Analysis of Cross-National Articles Reporting Fieldwork 
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Figure 7: Articles Reporting Fieldwork (Ukraine) 
 
 
 
Table 3: Regime Trajectories, Research Cycles, and Scientific Closure 
Regime trajectory Data Replicability Visibility Impact 
Democratization Original data 
collection 
 
High  High Consensus 
forming 
Autocratization Re-purposing  
 
High High Consensus 
confirming 
 
Adaptation, or 
non-standard 
techniques  
Low Low Consensus 
challenging  
 
Low  High Consensus 
infirming 
  
 Original data 
collection 
High High Consensus 
(re-)forming 
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1 Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org) evaluates countries along a number of 
categories, assigning a numerical score between one (most free) and seven (least free). The 
composite scores are compared in its annual “Freedom in the World” and “Nations in Transit” 
reports. 
2 Of course, the charges leveled against Sovietologists often amounted to caricature rather than 
actual assessment of their collective work. Indeed, scholars in the post-Soviet era increasingly 
turn to the past to find solutions for conducting research under the present regimes. For a review 
of Sovietology’s accomplishments and limitations, see Breslauer (1992), Engerman (2009), 
Rutland (2008), and Unger (1998). 
3 While Kyrgyzstan also underwent a color revolution in 2005, scholarly interest and published 
research remained minimal compared to Georgia and Ukraine. In any case, the new regime under 
Kurmanbek Bakiev failed to democratize and was overthrown by popular uprising in April 2010.  
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4 Cross-regional comparisons may be useful, of course, though arguably they would benefit from 
initial intra-regional comparisons to establish a baseline for observation. On cross-regional 
comparisons, see Chen and Sil (2007).  
5 Common patterns of academic control emerged under the totalitarian and communist 
dictatorships of the twentieth century. These involved: bringing teaching and research in line with 
ideology; ideologically-motivated purging of students and faculty; political control of access to 
universities; curtailing or eliminating university self-governance; and restricting international 
contacts (Grüttner, 2005).  
6 Gandhi (2010) argues that legislatures in fully authoritarian regimes help to ensure elite loyalty 
(and regime survivability) as mechanisms for inclusion and patronage.  
7 The journals are: American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, 
British Journal of Political Science, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Comparative 
Political Studies, Comparative Politics, Europe-Asia Studies, Government and Opposition, 
Perspectives on Politics, Politics & Society, Post-Soviet Affairs, Slavic Review, and World 
Politics.  
8 “Quantitative” articles chiefly involved survey data and the use of regression techniques. 
Descriptive statistics, alone, were not sufficient to categorize an article as quantitative. 
“Qualitative” articles reported interviews, use of focus groups, content analysis, or other forms of 
systematic textual analysis. “Mixed” articles involved some combination of both. In relying on 
scholars to report their methods and fieldwork, it is possible that this approach misses those 
scholars who conduct regular fieldwork but do not rely upon (or report) their field observations as 
part of their empirical strategy. Similarly, many of the authors of the descriptive and synthetic 
articles excluded from this study undoubtedly possessed fieldwork experiences that directly or 
indirectly had a bearing on their publications. My own sense is that researchers who combine 
serious amounts of regular fieldwork with quantitative research are relatively few in number. 
They are more likely to be part of the core group of experienced researchers who repeatedly 
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publish in the area than the larger floating group with higher rate of turnover. It may also be the 
case that disciplinary standards do not impose a sense that scholars’ fieldwork is valued or that it 
needs to be reported. Such matters go beyond the purview of this article, though conceivably one 
might begin to explore this possibility by polling scholars about their fieldwork and the rates at 
which they report it in their published work. However, if disciplinary standards are in play, then 
clever research design would be required to overcome social desirability bias.  
9 This might be due to personal developments (i.e., employment or family demands) so one must 
be careful not to read too much into this trend, though one might equally expect that scholars 
would continue to mine their hard-won fieldwork observations in later publications—particularly 
if personal circumstances constrained them from continuing active research. 
10 While experts on Ukraine might (rightly) protest that Ukrainian is not a commonly taught 
language, scholars may still be able to conduct fieldwork and communicate in Russian throughout 
much of Ukraine.  
11 This trend is comparable to the distribution of methods in published comparative research 
throughout the discipline (Mahoney, 2007).  
12 As Brown (2005: 2-3) notes, “It is hard to resist the conclusion that authoritarian systems do 
not get the attention they deserve in leading journals…mainly because some of the more 
fashionable modes of analysis cannot be usefully applied to their study.”  
13 One might see this as related to (or even a consequence of) scholars’ perception of 
“transitology” as the dominant paradigm in the study of post-communist politics (Gans-Morse, 
2004).  
14 For example, Tavits’s (2008) study of party system fluidity in “new democracies” in Eastern 
Europe includes Russian parliamentary elections in 1995, 1999, and 2003, and Ukrainian 
elections in 1998 and 2000. Similarly, Birch’s (2007) examination of electoral misconduct among 
postcommunist countries completely avoids regime categories. In explaining that “elections 
became competitive, with increased opportunities for voluntary contestation and participation” in 
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all postcommunist countries, elections in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, and Uzbekistan (to name a 
few) appear as “problematic” but still comparable to Croatia, Estonia, or Slovakia. 
15 Beliaev (2006: 394) examines institutional design among postcommunist democracies from 
1993 to 1998, acknowledging regime differences only in terms of the “weakness of democratic 
institutions” in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and other superpresidential regimes. Whitefield’s 
(2006) study of public views of representation in postcommunist democracies draws upon survey 
data collected between 1993 and 1997 in thirteen countries including Belarus, Russia, and 
Ukraine. Letki and Evans (2005: 519) use survey data collected in 1993-4 and the 1998 scores in 
Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy “to test the role social trust plays in the emergence of 
democracy” in East-Central Europe (including Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine). Anderson and 
Tverdova (2003: 91) use survey data collected in 1996 among “mature and newly established 
democracies,” including Russia. For a departure from this tendency that re-purposes earlier 
survey data for studying autocratization, see Rose et al. (2011).  
16 For example, see Cameron (2007), Dowley and Silver (2002), Hale (2005), and Kopstein and 
Reilly (2000).  
17 The need to publish timely and informed studies of events of this significance (along with the 
availability of information online) likely explains this tendency. 
18 While it would have been preferable to examine trends separately for Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Ukraine, the were too few published articles with identifiable methodologies (at most 1-2 per 
year) for Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.  
19 For a select series of exchanges and contributions, see Schmitter and Karl (1994), Bunce 
(1995), Bunce (1998), Cohen (1999), Fish (2001), Anderson et al. (2001), King (2000), McFaul 
(2002), Bunce (2003), and Hanson (2003).  
20 For a comparison of Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan after regime change, see Hale (2011).  
21 For the Data Access and Research Transparency statement, as well as the Journal Editors see 
<http://www.dartstatement.org/>. Debates on the implications of DA-RT may be found at 
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<https://dialogueondart.org/>. A valuable discussion including contributions from leading journal 
editors may be found in the Spring 2016 issue of the newsletter of APSA’s Comparative Politics 
organized section, available at: <http://comparativenewsletter.com/>. 
22 A valuable symposium on DA-RT that includes contributions from leading journal editors may 
be found in the Spring 2016 issue of the newsletter of APSA’s Comparative Politics organized 
section, available at: <http://comparativenewsletter.com/>. 
